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RETHINKING FIRST AMENDMENT ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT RACIST AND SEXIST SPEECH 
RODNEY A. SMOLL.A:* 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
An increase around the nation in incidents of racial and sexual harass-
ment,' particularly on university campuses, has led to calls for penalties on 
racist and sexist speech.2 This article is organized around a series of first 
"' James G. Cutler Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
The College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Portions of this article 
will appear in a somewhat different form in a forthcoming book by the author on the future 
of free speech. 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 16-26. The incidents include attacks based upon 
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, and sexual preference. I recognize that the balance of interests 
implicated by these attacks may not always be the same. The anatomy of racism, for example, 
may not resemble the anatomy of sexism in all respects. Similarly, speech attacking religion 
may trigger the special constitutional concerns of the Religion Clauses over and above whatever 
protection is provided by the Speech Clause. Compare Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 459 (1952) 
(striking down New York law prohibiting "sacrilegious" material) with Beauharnais v. Illinois, 
343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding Illinois group libel statute in context of racist attacks) 
(Beauharnais is discussed infra text accompanying notes 83-91). Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of this article, I mean by the phrase "racist and sexist speech" all speech attacks based on 
race, ethnicity, religion, sex, and sexual preference. I use the phrase as a shorthand for all 
such attacks and further assume that the constitutional analysis presented here would not be 
altered appreciably as the nature of the victimization changes. 
2. See, e.g., Au, Freedom from Fear, 15 LINCOLN L. REv. 45 (1984); Delgado, Words 
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HAR.v. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 445 
(1987); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. 
L. REv. 2320 (1989). 
This article had its genesis in the gracious invitation by students at the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law to comment on their proposal for a communicative torts statute 
that includes a section that would create tort liability for racial, sexual, or religious harassment. 
The proposal reads, in pertinent part: 
(a) A person who intentionally engages in a course of conduct that is addressed to 
an individual, that is specifically intended and reasonably likely to harass or intimidate 
the individual because of the individual's race, sex, [ethnic origin], or religion, and 
that directly causes serious emotional distress, is subject to liability to the individual: 
(i) for damages ... ; and 
(ii) in an action for injunctive relief .... 
(b) For the purposes of this Section, course of conduct means a pattern of com-
munication evincing a continuity of purpose. 
THE MoDEL CoMMUNICATIVE ToRTS AcT§ 6-103 (1989). 
The comment to § 6-103 indicates that the drafters of the proposed communicative torts 
act were in significant disagreement over whether to include a section grounding liability in 
racial, sexual, ethnic, or religious harassment. Id. The comment further states that the phrase 
"ethnic origin" was bracketed to reflect the view of "approximately one half of the drafters" 
that "ethnic origin should not be included because its inclusion would create too much 
confusion over the scope of the term." Id. 
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amendment themes, each presenting critical choices in free speech jurispru-
dence. For each choice, one can identify with relative ease the current 
prevailing first amendment orthodoxy. When one moves from the descriptive 
to the normative, however, asking not what the first amendment presently 
is, but what its future ought to be, the choices become excruciatingly close.3 
II. THE CoMPETING CoMMUNITARIAN AND LmERTARIAN VISIONS OF LAw. 
A. The Vision of Law as the Tie that Binds. 
The debate over controls on racist and sexist speech implicates a broader 
philosophical split in thinking over the purpose of the law. American 
intellectual history reflects this split in any number of ways, including the 
division between classic liberalism and civic republicanism that was visible 
3. Prevailing first amendment dogma maintains that speech may not be penalized merely 
because its content is racist or sexist. Indeed, under conventional modern free speech jurispru-
dence, racist speech qualifies for the very highest levels of first amendment shelter, perhaps 
even absolute protection, because it is thought of as "opinion." See infra text accompanying 
notes 38-44. Even if racist speech communicates little in the way of intellectual argument but 
is rather an invocation of raw hatred, prevailing first amendment principles protect the speech 
because the prevailing dogma refuses to countenance any distinction between the cognitive and 
the emotive elements of speech. The communicative thought and feeling equally are protected. 
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970); 
infra text accompanying notes 45-51. Thus, membership in groups that advocate racist positions 
may not be made illegal; advocacy of ideas such as racial or religious genocide may not be 
outlawed. Only if such speech is on the very verge of ripening into immediate violence may 
the speech be penalized. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); infra text accompanying 
notes 79-82. Furthermore, if that violence comes from the reactions of others to the hate-filled 
speech, our current orthodoxy normally is that the hecklers must be arrested, not the speakers. 
See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 
(1950). The capacity of racist attacks to cause deeply scarring psychic wounds or to undermine 
the values of racial equality and harmony that make meaningful community possible are 
discounted as harms too ephemeral to justify content-based speech restrictions. 
Despite these formidable constitutional barriers, the rise in racist incidents has lead to 
a proliferation of new regulations aimed at restricting racist speech. The proposal by the 
students at Washington and Lee is a particularly thoughtful effort. This article does not 
attempt to construct a comprehensive model for resolving the conflicts posed by controls on 
racist and sexist speech because such an effort is beyond the scope of the pieces contemplated 
for this Symposium. For this Symposium, the Washington and Lee Law Review asked for 
relatively short, lightly footnoted essays commenting on the various provisions of the proposed 
act. In light of those highly sensible instructions, this article seeks only to raise the themes 
implicated by the Washington and Lee proposal.· 
This article, however, does attempt to jar libertarian defenders of the first amendment 
from the doldrums of certitude, canvassing a number of strategies, old and new, through 
which defenders of controls on racist and sexist speech might seek to win over their libertarian 
colleagues. I include myself among those libertarian defenders. This article is an act of self-
examination in which I openly question many of my own past assumptions. Some of the 
suggestions in this piece, for example, are not reconciled easily with my prior writings. See, 
e.g., R. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988) 
[hereinafter R. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT]. 
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early on in our intellectual history.4 For the purposes of this essay, precision 
in intellectual history is less important than simply evoking two quite 
different impulses concerning the nature of law and the role of the state 
that continue to vie energetically for control of our legal culture. 
The first impulse, traceable as far back as Aristotle, is that law exists 
to make men good by binding men together in a cohesive and just com-
munity. Aristotle wrote: "It is evident that the state is a creation of nature, 
and that man is by nature a political animal. " 5 Aristotle did not mean this 
in the way the statement is sometimes used today-as a cynical "it's a 
jungle out there and law is all raw politics and power" indictment of the 
mean ego of humanity. Rather, this statement is optimistic, part of Aris-
totle's road to virtue. For Aristotle, it is politics in the highest and best 
sense-the practical art of organizing a community around principles of 
justice, equality, and virtue-that distinguishes man from the animals. 
According to Aristotle, man is a creature of the state because without the 
state man truly cannot be man. Law and justice are affirmations of the 
highest potential of the human condition. Only through communal living 
and through the state may men achieve virtue; only through the state may 
they find true peace, happiness, and fulfillment. Aristotle argues that "the 
state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and 
continuing in existence for the sake of the good life. " 6 Aristotle thus 
celebrated the potential for genuine human community: 
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is 
established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in 
order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities 
aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the 
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a 
greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. 7 
Aristotle's vision resonates throughout western political thought. When 
this Aristotelian impulse becomes the dominant mode of thinking in a 
society, there will be an inexorable tendency for the state to think that it 
is reasonable to exercise control over speech. Speech that promotes the good 
life and that affirms values of community, justice, and the rule of law will 
be fostered and nurtured by the state; speech destructive of those ends will 
be condemned. The philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, whose social contract 
4. See generally G. WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE MARsHALL COURT AND CuLTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35 (1988); Seigel, The Marshall Court 
and Republicanism, 67 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1989). This split in thinking continues to have great 
vibrancy. For an example of civic republicanism as the principal organizing theme in the work 
of a major American constitutional theorist, see M. TusHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 
5. ARISTonE, THE PoLmcs, Book I, Ch. 1, reprinted in G. CmusTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: 
TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (1973). 
6. /d. 
7. !d. at 12. 
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theory envisioned the state as a benign, friendly giant, a leviathan with a 
smile, thought it axiomatic that the state would exercise censorship over 
opinions: 
[I]t is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions 
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and con-
sequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be 
trusted withal!, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall 
examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For 
the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the well 
governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Ac-
tions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. 8 
B. The Counter Vision of Individual Autonomy. 
Because Aristotle is alive and well in American thought, legislatures 
often are motivated, rightly or wrongly, by an Aristotelian vision of law as 
making men good.9 Aristotle's vision competes in America, however, with 
a far brasher, more youthful, more daring, and disorderly philosophy, a 
libertarian streak that insists that Aristotle got it all wrong. Law does not 
exist to make men good; that is none of law's business. Law exists to keep 
minimal order, to provide for the common defense, to insure domestic 
tranquility. The John Stuart Mill in us instructs that the legitimate jurisdic-
tion of government extends only so far as is necessary to keep one citizen 
from harming another .10 Raising the level of public discourse or improving 
sensitivity to communal values is beyond the ken of the state. 
C. The Emotional Demographics of Controls on Racist and Sexist 
Speech. 
Proponents of controls on racist and sexist speech can draw impressive 
philosophical sustenance from the likes of Aristotle and Hobbes. Racial and 
sexual equality and tolerance are not just good ideas but the law of the 
land, 11 the declared public policies of the United States. 12 Hobbes was right: 
the actions of men proceed from their opinions, and racist and sexist 
opinions lead to an atmosphere of race-hate, an insensitivity that fosters 
acts of palpable violence and discrimination. 
Supporters of controls on racist and sexist speech, however, face a 
difficult decision over which they are likely to feel both philosophically 
8. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part II, Ch. 18, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, supra note 5, at 
327. 
9. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
10. See J. MILL, ON LmERTY (1859) (S. Collini ed. 1989). 
11. Professor Charles Lawrence of Stanford has been articulate in advancing this view. 
See Lawrence, The Debates Over Placing Limits on Racist Speech Must Not Ignore the Damage 
It Does to Its Victims, C!m.oN. OF HIGHER Enuc., October 25, 1989. See infra text accom-
panying notes 105-111. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 105-111. 
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conflicted and strategically unsure. For on this issue they find themselves 
Aristotelian thinkers seeking to influence a predominately libertarian club. 
Thus, the supporters of controls on racist and sexist speech must choose 
whether to fight this battle purely in Aristotelian terms or whether to meet 
the libertarians half-way by trying to convince the libertarians that the 
communal goals of tolerance and equality can be accommodated within the 
libertarian framework of free expression and an open marketplace. 
A personal dimension to this conflict exists. Many of the more eloquent 
exponents of controls on racist and sexist speech are persons who often 
have thought of themselves as libertarians or at least as part of a coalition 
in which libertarians have been their allies. It is not easy to be portrayed 
as against free speech and civil liberties by the same persons with whom 
you have fought so many battles for civil rights. 
The civil libertarians also have conflicts. Racist and sexist speech is 
hard to defend. Unlike the speech of socialists, labor unions, Darwinists, 
communists, or persecuted religions-the kinds of unpopular groups over 
which free speech battles were fought in the easy old days-the civil 
libertarian cannot in his or her heart truly imagine that the speech of the 
Ku Klux Klan or the Nazis can have any redeeming social value. Thus, the 
libertarian is forced to defend racists and sexists on the pure market principle 
that the lack of any discernable redeeming value does not matter. 
The libertarian, moreover, is pressed to define the contours of the harm 
principle. Even John Stuart Mill permits the state to intrude on individual 
liberty when its exercise will injure another. But what should count as 
injury? Moral indignation at the conduct of another is not enough in classic 
libertarian terms. Thus, laws against sodomy may not be justified by 
collective repugnance for gay lifestyles. The legislature may not criminalize 
sexual activity between two persons of the same sex merely because of 
majoritarian squeamishness. Some injury more palpable than moral outrage 
is required. When the legislature bans racist or sexist speech, is it acting in 
the same manner as when it discriminates against gay relationships? The 
libertarian may insist that the answer is yes and, therefore, both exercises 
of state power are illegitimate. 
If the proponents of controls on racist and sexist speech feel saddened 
by having their libertarian colleagues as opponents, they also may feel 
awkward about the identity of some of their strongest allies. Some conser-
vative voices will argue that the libertarians are exactly right: there are no 
differences in the thought patterns that permit the majority to enact its 
morality into law against gays, racists, and sexists. For these conservatives 
both types of laws are perfectly permissible because all law is a distillation 
of public morality. 
As a result, proponents of controls on racist and sexist speech who do 
not wish to sanction discrimination against gays and lesbians must devise a 
theory to explain why the libertarians are right in one case and wrong in 
the other. Two basic options are available. The first is to draw a distinction 
between a moral consensus based on prejudice, exclusion, and intolerance, 
and a moral consensus based on eliminating prejudice, fostering inclusion, 
176 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:171 
and promoting tolerance. The law may be the "witness and external deposit 
of our morallife,"13 but not any old morality will do. The moral judgments 
of the community that condemn racists and sexists are different in kind 
from the moral judgments that condemn lesbians and gays. 
The libertarian, however, will tend to blanche at this and reject the 
argument because it is too Aristotelian to swallow. Legislatures that pass 
laws that repress gays claim that they are "building community." The 
legislatures claim that they are rescuing society from mindless relativism 
and restoring moral fabric. The libertarian will insist that the legislature 
may not ·punish racists or gays in the pursuit of the good life for the 
community because in either case the legislature is exempting itself from 
the harm principle. 
The second and more promising line of argument for proponents of 
controls on racist and sexist speech concedes the legitimacy of the harm 
principle to libertarians but then takes issue with libertarians over what will 
qualify as harm. This line of argument requires an examination of the harm 
through the eyes of the victim. 
III. THE ANATOMY OF HATE; LAW THROUGH THE EYES OF VICTIMS. 
Patterns of thought often are forged by the hydraulic pressure of 
events. 14 The debate over liability for racial, sexual, or religious harassment 
has occupied center-stage at American universities in recent months as 
incidents of harassment have increased on campuses. If law should not be 
written solely from the perspective of victims, law, nonetheless, should be 
written only after the lawmaker has attempted to see the world through a 
victim's eyes.JS 
The Community Relations Service for the United States Department of 
Justice reported a steep increase in cases relating to racial tensions at 
institutions of higher learning during fiscal year 1988.16 A recent study by 
13. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897). 
14. See R. CRAGG, PURITANISM TO THE AGE OF REASON 190 (1966). I prefer this 
formulation to the cynical conclusory cliche that "hard cases make bad law." See Northern 
Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Great cases 
like hard cases make bad law."). Hard cases do not necessarily make bad law even though 
they may force new law. Hard cases commandeer the imagination and challenge us to reconsider 
old laws, possibly to refit the old laws to new and harder circumstances. 
15. A rich new jurisprudence of "empathy" is now prominent in feminist, critical legal 
studies and "law and literature" scholarship. See, e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 
MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Yudof, "Tea at the Palace of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal 
Rules, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 589 (1988). Professor Toni Massaro has written cogently that we 
should avoid both "foolish formalism" and "unguided emotion" in our legal reasoning. See 
Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 
MICH. L. REv. 2099, 2126 (1989) (stating that we should "revisit our experience and feelings 
along with other guides to reasoned judgments," and that we should "guard against empathic 
or intellectual blind spots when we construct and critique legal institutions and standards that 
govern us."). 
16. See Campus Anti-Bias Codes: A New Form of Censorship?, ANn-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH CJvn. RIGHTS DMSION POLICY BACKGROUND REPORT 1 (1989) (copy 
On file with author) [hereinafter ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE REPORT]. 
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the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence documents racist 
incidents at 250 colleges and universities since the fall of 1986.1' 
Anti-semitic violence is also on the increase on American campuses. 
According to an October 1989 report of the Civil Rights Division of the 
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, thirty-eight incidents of anti-semitic 
harassment occurred in 1988, the highest ever recorded by the Anti-Defa-
mation League. The upward trend appears to be continuing in 1989.18 
The incidents are an insult to tolerance and human dignity and an 
embarrassment to American universities. Incidents range from the random 
anonymities of hate graffiti to the mob desecration of anti-apartheid shan-
tytowns to ugly student newspaper slurs on the intellectual capacities of 
black faculty and students to the barbarous physical assault of white male 
students pouring human urine on a black female student passing beneath 
their dormitory window. These slurs rape the soul. 
The individual stories convey a dehumanizing pattern more distressing 
than the actual statistics. For example, at a University of Alabama football 
game, Alabama Governor Guy Hunt was crowning Kimberly Ashley, a 
black woman, homecoming queen when spectators' boos came from the 
stands and a few unfurled a Confederate flag. The University of Alabama 
President, Roger Sayers, issued a statement stating that the University 
"neither endorses nor tolerates statements, behavior, tokens, or insignias 
which deride or disparage any individual or group." The steering committee 
of the Alabama Faculty Senate condemned "racism in all its forms," and 
the student government unanimously passed a resolution denouncing the 
racist behavior.19 At the University of Virginia a Phi Gamma Delta fraternity 
flyer warned: "No short wops and no nega babes. " 20 At the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison, the Zeta Beta Tau fraternity held a fundraising 
"slave auction" in which fraternity members were auctioned off to perform 
services for bidders. Some of the fraternity members appeared in blackface 
and performed skits offensive to black students. 21 At Northwest Missouri 
State leaflets were distributed warning: "The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 
are watching you. " 22 At the University of Michigan white students painted 
themselves black and placed rings in their noses for a "jungle party."23 
Furthermore, a black woman walking past a residence hall at the 
University of Pennsylvania was taunted by two white men who poured urine 
on her as they leaned out a dormitory window.24 At the University of 
17. Lessons from Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, September 25, 1989, at 48. 
18. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE REPORT, supra note 16, at l. 
19. Crowd at Homecoming Boos Black Queen, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., November 4, 
1989. 
20. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2333 n.71 (citing Harris, Hindman's "Nega" Example 
Reveals Problem, Cavalier Daily (University of Virginia), Nov. 10, 1988, at 2, col. 2). 
21. Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech 
Issues, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., October 4, 1989, at A38. 
22. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2333 n.7l. 
23. /d. 
24. Wilson, supra note 21, at A38. 
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Connecticut two Asian students were subjected to slurs and spit by a group 
of white students.25 At Dartmouth a professor was called "a cross between 
a welfare queen and a bathroom attendant," and the Dartmouth Review 
purported to quote a black student as saying: "Dese boys be sayin' that 
we be comin' here to Dartmut an' not takin' the classics. " 26 
If there is "no negligence in the air, " 27 perhaps also there is no legal 
injury in the air. The conceptual mind of the lawyer finds it difficult to 
measure the metes and bounds of legally cognizable harm without thinking 
immediately of the adjacent conceptual property out of which the boundaries 
of harm will be carved. If the emotional harm caused by racist speech is 
understood as outrage at the message of the speech, libertarians are unlikely 
to treat the harm as sufficient to overcome first amendment protections 
because of the bedrock principle that controls on speech never should be 
permitted merely because of disagreement with the message. 
Perhaps, however, we incorrectly characterize the harm by conceptual-
izing it in terms of outrage at the message. Perhaps the emotional wound 
is not the stuff of "agreement" or "disagreement" because there is nothing 
to agree or disagree with in the speech. Perhaps outrage at the "message" 
gives the speech more credit than it deserves because there is no message, 
at least no intellectual message, to be outraged against. If we are to pursue 
this tack, however, and use the harm as a foil to reveal the lack of 
intellectual content in the "speech," we will need first to uncoil and then 
rebraid the strands from which contemporary first amendment doctrines are 
woven. 
IV. UNRAVELING THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONAL STRANDS OF SPEECH. 
A. The First Amendment and Bipolar Thought. 
Free speech jurisprudence often seems a collage of confusing bipolar 
choices: Is it speech or conduct? Does it communicate thought or emotion? 
Does the regulation state facts or opinion? Is the regulation content-based 
or content-neutral? Is the government property a forum or a nonforum? Is 
the speech political or nonpolitical? Commercial or noncommercial? For 
adults or children? 
Controls on racist and sexist speech implicate many of these classic 
dichotomies. Rather than attempt to canvass them all, I will emphasize 
those that comprise the crucial pressure points in the debate. 
B. Fact v. Opinion 
To unravel the rope we must first loosen a strand, and the dichotomy 
between fact and opinion is a convenient place to start. The law of 
25. /d. 
26. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2333 n. 71. 
27. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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defamation traditionally has divided the universe of speech into two cate-
gories: fact and opinion. The division began in the common law and now 
has been absorbed into first amendment jurisprudence. The current doctrine 
is neat and simple: a factual statement is actionable and an expression of 
opinion is not.28 The only task for modern defamation law is classification, 
and tests proliferate articulating the appropriate analytic devices for per-
forming the operation. The consequence of thinking of speech in the bipolar 
terms of fact and opinion for the purposes of the problem of racist and 
sexist attacks is that the attacks will be classified as opinion, and thus 
deemed absolutely protected under the first amendment. 
The universe of speech, however, does not need to be divided according 
to the orthodoxy of defamation law. We could divide speech into three, 
four, five, or six categories depending on the breadth of our imagination 
and intellectual ingenuity. Imagine, for example, a taxonomy of speech 
recognizing as many as six "functional genres": 1) statements of fact, 2) 
statements of opinion, 3) statements of transaction, 4) statements of incite-
ment, 5) statements of emotion, and 6) statements of art and entertainment, 
with different levels of first amendment protection for each. Human beings 
do not speak in airtight categories, of course, and any given statement may 
be an admixture of two or more of the types of statements identified above. 
That, however, does not disable us from identifying the principal defining 
characteristics of each category. 
C. Six Functional Genres of Speech. 
1. Statements of Fact and the Epistemological Skepticism of Free Speech 
Jurisprudence. 
A statement of fact tends to be capable of objective verification. It 
purports to express the truth about some aspect of reality that may be 
measured and calibrated in time and space and that can be proved or 
disproved with evidence. While even the most simple declaratory sentence 
cannot escape the judgments and conventions attendant to any use of 
language, in the common sense of everyday usage a statement such as 
"John Smith is black" is normally thought of as a statement of fact.29 
Intuitively, one might think that statements of fact deserve the highest 
level of first amendment protection. But this is not the case. The permissible 
range of governmental regulation of statements of fact is far broader than 
28. See generally R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 6.01-6.12 (1986) [hereinafter R. 
SMOLLA]. 
29. Even a statement with such a straightforward syntax as "John Smith is black" in 
context may be a statement of opinion. The negation of the statement may be even more 
likely to express opinion. To say "John Smith is not black" or "John Smith is not a Native 
American," for example, may be a statement laden heavily with ideological perspectives on 
the nature of ethnic or racial identity. In context, for example, such statements may be "code" 
for "John Smith is an uncle tom." 
180 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:171 
the permissible range of regulation of opinion. By definition statements of 
fact are statements in which it is possible to verify objectively their truth 
or falsity with relative confidence. Prevailing doctrine posits that "there is 
no constitutional value in false statements of fact. " 30 Thus, statements of 
fact may be subject to regulation for their truth or falsity. 
The point that there is no first amendment value in factual falsehood, 
however, threatens at times to degenerate into a tired and misleading cliche. 
One must be careful about what is meant by the proposition. Prevailing 
free speech jurisprudence is adamant in its insistence that the proposition 
does not mean that there is no first amendment protection for false 
statements of fact. We provide false statements of fact with a degree of 
protection that they do not intrinsically deserve because of the abiding 
skepticism of contemporary first amendment epistemology. 
The epistemological skepticism of modern first amendment thought has 
two components. Current first amendment thought is doubtful about the 
ability of institutional decisionmakers, such as juries, judges, law enforce-
ment officials, or university faculties, to separate true facts from false facts 
and is even more suspicious of the spurious surgical precision with which 
such institutional decisionmakers often purport to distinguish fact · from 
opinion. Clearly, there is at least some first amendment value (we may 
argue over how much) even in the misguided opinion. It may or may not 
be that good opinions will prosper in the market and drive out bad ones, 
but it is certainly true that on at least some occasions good opinion is 
illuminated through its collision with error. 31 It is healthy to be exposed to 
positions that proceed from basic premises and even norms of argument 
different from one's own. 
We do not wish to penalize factual truth. Because truth and falsity are 
often difficult to distinguish, courts have devised constitutional doctrines, 
such as the rules governing burdens of proof on the issue of falsity in 
defamation cases,32 that deliberately "overprotect" false facts to provide a 
buffer zone of safety for true facts. Similarly, we do not wish to penalize 
expressions of opinion. Because statements of fact and statements of opinion 
are often difficult to distinguish, courts have devised constitutional doctrines 
that instruct the decisionmaker to err on the side of classifying speech as 
opinion. Once again, this results in a penumbra of constitutional immuni-
zation for false fact to protect the expression of opinion at the constitutional 
coreY 
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
31. When attempts are made to ground the first amendment in utilitarian thinking, it is 
necessary to confront the question of how often good speech will drive out bad speech and 
how this net calculation compares with the long-term benefits of freedom of speech other than 
its actual performance in ferreting out truth reduced by the short-term costs in tolerating 
speech that causes discernable harms. This calculation is too difficult for the primitive legal 
physics of today, and thus, we usually substitute leaps of faith one way or another. 
32. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
33. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
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2. Statements of Opinion and the Creeping Nihilism of First Amendment 
Theory. 
A statement of opinion will tend to elude objective verification. The 
most easily identifiable opinion is value-laden, expressing preferences of 
personal taste, aesthetics, literary criticism, religious beliefs, moral convic-
tions, political views, and social theories. Thus, the statement "John Smith 
is an uncle tom" is different from the statement "John Smith is black," 
because to call Smith an uncle tom is to invoke the ianguage of conviction 
and belief, expressing the viewpoint that Smith is a traitor to the interests 
of his race. 
Many statements combine elements of fact and opinion. A statement 
may be cast in the ostensible language of fact though in context it is 
primarily or exclusively a statement of opinion. The statement "John Smith 
is a murderer" is a statement of opinion when it appears on a placard as 
part of a right to life protest against the performance of abortions by 
Doctor John Smith. The translated subtext is: "Abortion is murder; John 
Smith performs abortions; John Smith is a murderer." 
Conversely, statements couched in the form of opinion may be state-
ments of fact masquerading as statements of opinion. The statement "In 
my opinion, John Smith is a murderer" takes on a factual cast if it is a 
statement made by an eyewitness to a shooting incident between Smith and 
White in which White was killed and the question being investigated is who 
fired first and who merely fired back in self-defense. Against that contextual 
backdrop, the statement is laden with the factual subtext: "Smith fired first 
upon White, murdering him." 
Statements of opinion also may be intertwined with other categories of 
speech. Opinions are often used as vehicles for incitement34 and often convey 
emotion.35 Both the persuasion and emotion may be related to a proposal 
to enter into a transaction. 36 In determining whether a statement is one of 
opinion or fact, courts have employed a variety of tests, including the 
degree of verifiability, the common usage or meaning of the language, the 
use of cautionary or qualifying terms, the genre of the speech, and the 
broader social context in which the statement is made.37 
Statements of opinion, in prevailing first amendment doctrine, receive 
the highest order of protection. Statements of opinion, indeed, may be 
afforded absolute protection at least when they concern issues of public 
concern. At one time the common-law protection for "opinion" or "fair 
comment" in defamation actions extended only to "fair" or "reasonable" 
opinions. 38 The "fairness" or "reasonableness" of the comment usually was 
left to the jury's relatively unguided judgment.39 This practice permitted 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 58-70, 79·82. 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 45-51. 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
37. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 28, at §§ 6.06-6.08. 
38. /d. § 6.02[3]. 
39. Id. 
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juries to judge the "worth" of the speaker's viewpoint, and thus carried 
the potential for persecution of unpopular opinion. The common law of 
defamation, therefore, often permitted the prosecution of "outrageous" 
opinion.40 
When the Supreme Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 41 that 
"[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea,"42 the 
Court emancipated the outrageous opinion from legal censure. "However 
pernicious an opinion may seem," the Court stated, "we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition 
of other ideas. " 43 This statement in Gertz is almost nihilistic in its denial 
of any constitutional authority for the state to absorb community values 
and enact them into law. It is a flat ban on the use of the Aristotelian and 
Hobbesian impulse that the law exists to make men good and the wise 
governing of men proceeds from the wise governing of their opinions.44 
However, a potential chink exists in the libertarian armor. Is every 
racist or sexist statement necessarily a statement of opinion? 
3. Statements of Emotion. 
A statement of emotion in its pure form has no cognitive message at 
all, but rather conveys raw, unvarnished feeling. One promising analytic 
solution to the problem of racist speech is to reject the prevailing first 
amendment orthodoxy refusing to recognize any distinction between the 
emotional and cognitive side of speech. This would not require stripping 
emotional speech of all protection-indeed, in the context of artistic and 
entertaining speech, the emotional component might enjoy enhanced pro-
tection-but it would require recognition that the degree to which emotion 
is part of the "mix" of the speech may affect the level of protection the 
speech enjoys when considered in light of the presence or absence of other 
redeeming elements. 
Some libertarians will be repelled instantly by any suggestion that the 
emotional side of speech may be separated from the intellectual side. It 
may, be possible to satisfy those concerns, however, by employing the same 
sort of "breathing space" methodology that informed our rules governing 
protection of true facts and expression of opinions. The epistemological 
skepticism of libertarian first amendment jurisprudence does not insist that 
government never may classify speech according to its function, but only 
that government must build into its classification system devices that are 
overprotective. The task of devising a principled basis for separating the 
emotive from the cognitive elements of speech is so difficult that it may 
40. Jd. 
41. 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
43. Id. at 339-40. 
44. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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require even more overprotection than in other contexts. The following rule, 
however, arguably would do the job: 
When statements of emotion are intertwined with statements of 
opinion in general public discourse settings, the absolute protection 
for statements of opinion controls, and the emotional components 
of the speech are absolutely protected. In certain "restricted zones" 
outside the realm of general public discourse, however, the absolute 
protection for statements of opinion does not apply. In such contexts 
the government may proscribe the speech if it can demonstrate 
compelling state interests and if the regulation is narrowly tailored 
to achieve those interests. Controls on racist and sexist speech 
communicating racial superiority, advocating violence, or expressing 
nothing other than hate-with no ideological position expressed or 
implied-will satisfy the compelling state interest requirement, and 
if narrowly drafted, be constitutional. 
This rule is obviously in tension with the Gertz proclamation that under 
the first amendment there is no such thing as a false idea if we understand 
that proclamation as contemplating that the statement will contain a dis-
cernable "idea." But as developed more fully in the concluding section of 
this article, government may carve out of the general marketplace of 
discourse certain restricted zones in which the Gertz rule does not apply. 
But does it even make sense to talk of statements of emotion? It might 
be maintained that when conceptualized in these terms the phrase "statement 
of emotion" is an oxymoron because for the use of language to make a 
statement of emotion by definition will implicate more than the emotion 
alone. Language is an intellectual enterprise. The moment we graduate from 
grunts and groans to words, sentences, and paragraphs, we leave behind 
the inarticulate speech of the heart and set in motion the waves of the 
brain. 
None of our categories, however, need be pure to be recognized. A 
statement of emotion might be defined as a statement conveying no cognitive 
message other than the static level of cognition required to use language. 
What I mean by "language of emotion" is language that requires no more 
thought than the ability to spell; language that states no fact, offers no 
opinion, proposes no transaction, attempts no persuasion; language that 
contains no humorous punch-line, no melodic rhythm, no color or shape 
or texture that might pass as art or entertainment; language that embodies 
emotion with no elaborative gloss other than feeble minimum intellectual 
current necessary to power the use of words. 
Take a vulgar or racist word etched on the door of the bathroom stall. 
Imagine it is only one word and that the word stands alone. For the 
moment, do not imagine any particular word, but think, for the sake of 
argument, only of the function of this generic vulgarity. It is not part of 
any larger joke, political commentary, philosophical nugget, or personal 
libel. While it would not be fair to say that this word contains no intellectual 
component because the re~der will recognize the word, "process" it men-
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tally, and perhaps for a fleeting moment conjure up the physical imagery 
that it conveys, it would be fair to say that what the word primarily 
communicates is not properly thought of as intellectual. 
Speech uttered to another human being, particularly in the physical 
presence of the listener, is even more susceptible of being a blend that 
approaches a ratio of emotional to cognitive nearly ninety-nine to one. 
Imagine that John Smith, a black person, is walking down the street, when 
a stranger snarls "Nigger!" to his face. Speech in this instance seems to 
communicate only the uncut emotions of hate and insult. The best we might 
do to give the speech a patina of intellectual content is to treat the speech 
as containing the subtext: "John Smith, you nigger, I hate you," or perhaps 
adding: "I hate you all." Even this, however, may be too generous. 
Justice Frankfurter stated in Niemotko v. Mary/and:45 "A man who is 
calling names or using the kind of language which would reasonably stir 
another to violence does not have the same claim to protection as one 
whose speech is an appeal to reason. " 46 In the obscenity context the Supreme 
Court has distinguished control of obscene speech from "control of reason 
and intellect."47 We might articulate one of the preeminent goals of free 
speech as the triumph of intellect over passion and reason over prejudice. 
In 1941 the Court stated: "[In] back of the guaranty of free speech lay 
faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for 
gaining access to the mind. " 48 
One might think that the Supreme Court's holding in cases 
such as Texas v. Johnson, 49 Hustler Magazine v. Fa/we//, 50 or Cohen 
45. 340 u.s. 268 (1951). 
46. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
47. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973). 
48. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941). 
49. 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989). In Johnson the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 
conviction under a Texas statute for flag desecration, which was defined under the law as 
defacing, damaging, or physically mistreating a "venerated object in a way that the actor 
knows will offend seriously one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action." Id. 
at 2541. 
50. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Hustler case arose from a crude parody run by Hustler 
Magazine depicting Reverend Falwell as an incestuous drunk. Id. at 48. The Supreme Court 
ruled without dissent that the parody was protected under the first amendment. Id. at 53. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the Hustler parody was at best a distant cousin of the 
conventional political cartoon "and a rather poor relation at that." In what may have been 
the single most important analytic step in his opinion, however, Rehnquist argued that there 
was simply no way to draw a principled distinction between the Hustler parody and other 
satiric efforts. Id. "If it were possible," stated Rehnquist, "by laying down a principled 
standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or 
no harm." I d. But the Supreme Court was doubtful, Rehnquist explained, that any reasonably 
concrete standard could ever be articulated. Id. One thing was certainly clear: the amorphous 
pejorative "outrageous" was too subjective to withstand first amendment requirements. Id. 
To permit a jury to impose liability for mere "outrageousness" would invite jurors to base 
liability on the basis of their tastes and prejudices. Id. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist then made it clear that the mere capacity of speech to embarrass 
1990] RACIST AND SEXIST SPEECH 185 
v. California/1 forbid recognition of any dichotomy between the emotional 
and cognitive sides of speech. Those three decisions (I would defend all 
three), however, do not necessarily stand for the proposition that no division 
between the emotional and intellectual attributes of speech is defensible. In 
all three cases the speech was uttered in the general marketplace of public 
discourse, and there was an intellectual subtext to the emotionally graphic 
speech. 
While it is tempting to explain the Supreme Court's decisions on the 
grounds that the Supreme Court refuses to recognize any distinction between 
the emotional and intellectual content of speech, the cases are explained 
more properly in terms of a narrower proposition: Intellectual speech does 
or offend did not strip speech of its protected character. Id. In citing the holdings in FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978}, the George Carlin "fighting words" case (discussed 
infra at text accompanying notes 114-19}, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) (the "fighting words" case discussed infra at text accompanying notes 103-04}, Rehnquist 
emphasized that those holdings represented narrow exceptions to the general first amendment 
rule that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 55-56. While 
the Court recognized that all speech is not of equal first amendment importance, Rehnquist 
explained that the speech in this case simply did not fit into the precisely drawn categories in 
which lower levels of protection have been permitted. Id. at 56. Rehnquist wrote: 
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one 
here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false 
statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,'i.e., with knowledge that the 
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true. 
Id. Here, the jury had found that the statement was not factual. Id. at 57. In the absence of 
a misstatement of fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Falwell could not recover for 
the mere intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. See generally R. SMOUA, JERRY 
FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT, supra note 3. 
51. 403 U.S. 15 (1970). In Cohen, where the defendant wore the words "fuck the draft" 
on his jacket, the Court emphasized that the state was not exercising its police power "to 
prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to a hostile reaction." Id. at 
20. Rather, the state was attempting to penalize only the fact of communication. Id. The 
Court held that the state could not do this: 
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the state has 
no legal right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable 
to the most squeamish among us .... For, while the particular four-letter word 
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is 
never the less often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. 
Id. at 25. 
Similarly, in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969}, a flag desecration case, the 
Court wrote: 
[A]ny shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the content of the 
ideas expressed. It is frrmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression 
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are offensive to 
some of their hearers. 
As emphasized in the text, these cases are all distinguishable from the expression of pure hate 
characteristic of many racist insults. In Johnson, Hustler, Cohen, and Street, there were 
redeeming undercurrents of protest. To have censored the mode would have been to have 
censored the message. In utterances of raw, emotive race-hate, however, there is no message 
to censor. 
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not forfeit its first amendment protection merely because it is intertwined 
with emotional speech. Thus, an intellectual component may immunize 
emotional speech from legal regulation in somewhat the same way that 
"redeeming social value" operates to rescue sexual speech from classification 
as obscenity. When emotional speech stands naked and alone, however, 
with no plausible cognitive content to clothe it, the first amendment values 
requiring a "free trade in ideas" do not apply. 
4. Statements of Transaction. 
Some controls on racist and sexist speech are merely extensions of civil 
rights acts and labor laws in which racist and sexist language is used to 
identify racist and sexist behavior. When the National Labor Relations 
Board sets aside an election because it is tainted with racial propaganda52 
or when a suit is brought to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 196453 or the 
Fair Housing Act of 196854 and the "smoking gun" is a racist or sexist 
remark, the level of first amendment scrutiny may be reduced. This reduction 
is justified if one recognizes a functional genre of speech constituting 
"statements of transaction." 
A statement of transaction does not state a fact in the conventional 
sense. It is not a description of reality subject to verification nor does it 
express an opinion as that term is normally used; rather, a statement of 
transaction is the use of language to propose or conclude some form of 
transaction. A simple example: "John Smith, I will rent to you this 
apartment if you will pay me $300 per month." While the term "transac-
tion" has commercial overtones, statements of transaction need not be 
limited to commercial speech. The statement "I will meet you at the gym 
to play basketball" is a statement of transaction. 
Statements of transaction also are not limited to the cold, sterile forms 
of offer and acceptance. Thus, statements of transaction may be appended 
to statements of fact, opinion, emotion, or persuasion. Statements of 
transaction may be imbued more directly with elements of these categories. 
The statement "Will you marry me?" may, in context, convey elements of 
52. See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). In Sewell the NLRB held that 
"prejudice based on color is a powerful emotional force" and "a deliberate appeal to such 
prejudice is not intended or calculated to encourage the reasoning faculty" and, therefore, 
"[t]he Board does not intend to tolerate as 'electoral propaganda' appeals or arguments which 
can have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the election." The 
NLRB's analysis here is fascinating. It appears to argue much the same point that I stressed 
earlier: that it is possible to sever the purely emotional content of speech from any bona fide 
opinion. Because the racial appeals at issue also might have been intertwined with protected 
speech ("labor propaganda"), the safer argument might be that the normal first amendment 
rules do not apply in the unique context of "labor speech," for labor speech wiii always 
contain a "transactional" quality that permits greater governmental regulation. The government 
here is not regulating speech about race so much as race relations between management and 
labor as manifest in the propaganda surrounding Board-certified elections. 
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(h)(6) (1982). 
54. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3619 (1982). 
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(1) fact (subtext: "My current state of heart and mind is that I want to 
marry you."); (2) opinion (subtext: "We will be happy."); (3) transaction 
(subtext: "I propose a marital contract."); (4) emotion (subtext: "I love 
you."); and (5) persuasion (subtext: "Just say yes.") 
Statements of transaction deserve only a relatively low order of first 
amendment protection. 55 A statement that is nothing other than transactional 
may receive no first amendment protection at all. Laws governing commer-
cial transactions, for example, such as the laws governing the language that 
must appear on a negotiable instrument, never have been thought to 
implicate freedom of speech. To regulate the language is to regulate the 
transaction. We do not think of laws governing the language on promissory 
notes as laws governing speech about promissory notes but rather as laws 
governing promissory notes. 
Because virtually all transactions are effectuated through language, 
freedom of speech never has been thought to encompass all use of language. 
To qualify as freedom of speech language must be more than merely 
transactional. Advertising is an example of speech that is more than merely 
transactional. Advertising often contains statements of fact, opinion, emo-
tion, persuasion, art, or entertainment. Thus, laws governing advertising 
are analyzed today under a four-prong constitutional test that provides at 
least a modicum of first amendment protection.56 Because advertising is a 
form of commercial speech that is primarily transactional, however, the 
level of protection is low, certainly much lower than the protection for 
most forms of speech with little or no transactional elements. 
When the speech is an element of some other oppressive, coercive, or 
harassing activity, might it not create in combination with that other activity 
a cause of action that would raise less serious first amendment objections? 
Infliction of emotional distress by an oppressive bill collector or through 
sexual harassment on the job may be effectuated by "speech." The gra-
vamen of the tortious activity in such cases, however, is arguably the 
proscription of underlying nonspeech conduct such as an oppressive com-
mercial tactic or anti-social behavior in the workplace. The penalty exacted 
on speech in such cases appears incidental to the governmental purpose of 
regulating the purely expressive component of the conduct. 
Because much of our concern about racist and sexist speech does in 
fact arise in such transactional settings, controls that are conscientiously 
aimed at eliminating racism and sexism in those transactional relationships 
should be constitutional if properly tailored. 
55. Current first amendment doctrine does not recognize a category for statements of 
transaction. It does recognize a lower level of first amendment protection for "private speech." 
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). It also recognizes a special category for commercial speech. 
See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
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5. Statements of Art and Entertainment. 
Statements of art and entertainment are easy to describe and hard to 
define. They include such genres as fiction, music, visual and performing 
arts, and humor. They may combine some or all of the other categories 
discussed here, conveying facts, opinions, transactions, emotions, and per-
suasion. Defining art and entertainment, however, is difficult. How does 
one define art in a matter that is not elitist or pompous but also not so 
democratic and standardless as to be vacuous? Humor is no easier. In 
Woody Allen's movie, Crimes and Misdemeanors, Alan Aida plays a 
character who pontificates on the definition of comedy as "tragedy plus 
time." 
If we required perfect definitional perfection, artistic and entertaining 
speech would confound us. We would be tempted to surrender to definitions 
grounded in empty tautology and self-proclamation (''Art is speech presented 
as art by an artist as art.") or in the purely descriptive actions of markets 
("Art is whatever sells as art"; "Art is what critics accept as art"; "Art is 
whatever a culture accepts as art."). 
A fair working definition might begin, like a sculptor creating shape 
from a mass of stone, by cutting away what we know art is not. Art is not 
pure fact, opinion, or emotion. It does not offer itself as fact but as a play 
on reality, a rendering, an interpretation. Art does not offer itself as plain 
opinion but as opinion filtered through imagination. It does not speak to 
the emotion alone but to emotion tempered by relations of substance and 
form. 57 
There should be no liability for racist and sexist speech that is part of 
artistic or entertaining expression. We might think of speech in this context 
as inherently incapable of ever satisfying any of the demands of modern 
first amendment epistemological skepticism. The law has no centrifuge 
sufficiently powerful to separate the strands of fact, opinion, and emotion 
that comprise the peculiar alchemy of imaginative speech. 
6. Statements of Incitement. 
Modern free speech jurisprudence first began to crystalize around the 
problem of incitement,S8 and it is one of the most familiar components in 
the debate over controls on racist and sexist speech. Statements of incitement 
are statements made with the intent and form of inducing action. There are 
57. Satire, for example, is often effective precisely because it is shocking to mainstream 
cultural sensibilities. The satirist's very purpose is often to be "outrageous" and "indecent," 
and to incite anger, revulsion, and controversy. The "bite" of satire is often its potency. One 
unavoidable consequence of satire's emotive power is its greater capacity to inflict pain than 
that of other genres of speech. It is a fact of American life that an attack on a public figure 
in a context such as Doonesbury may have more impact than scores of detached analytic 
essays by commentators on op-ed pages. 
58. See generally Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 1205 (1983). 
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two types. First, the speaker may seek to incite allies to help effectuate the 
speaker's purposes. Second, the speaker may seek to incite enemies to react 
against him. 
Statements of incitement always will be composites of other types of 
statements to the point where statements of incitement arguably do not 
deserve classification as a separate category at all but rather should be seen 
as statements of opinion, transaction, or emotion in which swaying others 
is the overriding purpose. All transactional speech, it might be argued, 
includes inducement as an implicit motive. All opinions, it might be main-
tained, are expressed for the motive of suasion. As Holmes put it: "Every 
idea is an incitement. " 59 
In common-sense usage, however, while statements of incitement always 
may be composites of other types of statements, they cross a threshold of 
immediacy analogous to the concept of proximate cause in tort that legiti-
mates their treatment as a unique category. Holmes was wrong. Not every 
idea is an incitement. Opinions may express general preferences on matters 
of taste, aesthetics, or morals in which the speaker is merely engaging in 
self-expressive interpretations of reality largely indifferent to whether others 
accept the opinion or act upon it. Alternatively, opinions may be part and 
parcel with exhortation, graduating from mere interpretations of reality to 
concrete persuasive efforts to convince others to modify reality. Justice 
Harlan acknowledged this dichotomy in Yates v. United States, 60 proclaiming 
that the "essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is 
addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than 
merely to believe in something. " 61 An example of a statement that in a 
proper context would be more than mere opinion and legitimately classifiable 
as incitement is: "John Smith deserves to die; let us storm his home, take 
him out to the woods, and kill him." 
The incitement category tends to be confusing in debates over racist 
and sexist speech because libertarians do not deny that incitement may be 
penalized. Libertarians, rather, cling to the modern rules requiring the 
government to demonstrate a tight nexus between the inciting language and 
the illegal conduct on a case-by-case basis. Proponents of controls on racist 
and sexist speech, on the other hand, would relax this modern rule, 
permitting a return to what might be called "generic clear and present 
danger." 
There was a time in our first amendment jurisprudence where it was 
taken for granted that a legislature could effectively "precertify" certain 
identified classes of speech as satisfying the requirement of proximity to a 
substantive issue the government has a right to prevent. This was one of 
the principal themes in Git/ow v. New York,62 where the Court approved 
59. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
60. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
61. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957). 
62. 268 u.s. 652 (1925). 
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proscription of utterances that "by their very nature, involve danger to the 
public peace and to the security of the State. " 63 You cannot start a fire 
without a spark, 64 and the Court was convinced that a "single revolutionary 
spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a 
sweeping and destructive conflagration. " 65 
The Court in Gitlow did not require that foreseeable harm be demon-
strated in each individual prosecution. 66 Rather, the legislature could make 
a generic determination applicable to a broad class of speech and thereby 
estop individuals from claiming that their particular speech posed no serious 
threats. Thus, the Court admonished: 
When the legislative body has determined generally, in the consti-
tutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind 
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished 
the question whether any specific utterance coming within the 
prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the 
substantive evil is not open to consideration. 67 
This device of deference to generic legislative determinations has been 
abandoned in contemporary first amendment doctrine. In Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 68 for example, the Court stated flatly that 
"[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when first 
amendment rights are at stake."69 Furthermore, in Cohen v. Ca/ifornia10 
the Court rejected the view that the state could specify in advance language 
that is inherently likely to cause violent reaction. 71 
Acceptance of the generic clear and present danger test would require 
a retreat that libertarians are unwilling to make. That unwillingness places 
American libertarians at odds with American proponents of controls on 
racist or sexist speech, and even more strikingly, at odds with the rest of 
the world. While we are in the midst of a national debate concerning the 
conflicts between free speech and racial, religious, or sexual harassment, 
most other nations do not see the problem because for them it seems 
obvious that free speech does not include the right to engage in racist or 
sexist attacks. 
We need not look to cultures markedly different from our own to see 
how far out of step our views of protections for racist speech are from 
prevailing world opinion. The Public Order Act72 in Great Britain, for 
63. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). 
64. See Bruce Springsteen, "Dancing in the Dark," in Born in the U.S.A., ASCAP 
(1984). 
65. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669. 
66. Id. at 669-70. 
67. Id. at 670. 
68. 435 u.s. 829 (1978). 
69. Landmark Communication!', Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). 
70. 403 u.s. 15 (1970). 
71. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-24 (1970). 
72. 1986, ch. 64, § 18. 
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example, forbids incitement to racial hatred, including the use of "threat-
ening, abusive, or insulting" language. The Swedish Penal Code states: 
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other commu-
nication which is spread among the public threatens or expresses 
contempt for an ethnic group or other such group of persons with 
allusion to race, skin colour, national or ethnic origin or religious 
creed, he shall be sentenced for agitation against ethnic group ... .73 
European nations enforce these laws. In 1980 eleven youths attending 
a basketball game between an Israeli and Italian team carried wooden 
crosses and shouted the slogans "Jews to the ovens" and "Hitler taught 
us it's no crime to kill the Jews!" The youths were arrested and convicted 
in an Italian court of exalting genocide and sentenced to three years and 
four months imprisonment.74 West Germany criminalizes the writing, print-
ing, or distributing of material glorifying acts of violence against human 
beings or incitement to hatred. Nazi signs, symbols, labels, and uniforms 
are illegal. The Nazi greeting "Heil Hitler!" is outlawed. These German 
laws have been used to penalize the spray-painting of swastikas and the 
slogan "Die Jew" on an unmarked police car.75 
International law norms on hate speech began to crystalize in 1959 and 
grew out of a growing number of anti-Semitic incidents around the world, 
including outbursts of swastika painting in many nations.76 With the memory 
of Hitler's hate propaganda and the holocaust seared in the consciousness 
of the international community, efforts began in the United Nations to 
draft a treaty aimed at the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. 
From the beginning, the problem of how to reconcile freedom of speech 
with the goal of eliminating hate propaganda was a centerpoint of debate. 
There was no disagreement on the urgency of combating discrimination. 77 
Consensus began to unravel, however, on how to treat racist speech. By 
1964, in the United Nations, the Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had before it a draft submitted 
by Poland and the Soviet Union that banned all propaganda containing a 
message of racial superiority and that made it illegal to be a member of 
any organization that engaged in or advocated discrimination. It should be 
remembered that this was the same year that the United States passed what 
may have been the most important piece of social legislation in American 
history, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet, in its draft submission to the 
international Subcommission, the United States would have banned only 
government involvement, chartering, or support of racial supremacy organ-
73. SwEo. PENAL CoDE ch. 16, § 8 (1986), reprinted in Matsuda, supra note 2, at 3248 
n.147. 
74. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocmTY 255 n.66 (1986). 
75. Jd. at 256 n.66. 
76. R. LULICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (1979). 
77. See generally N. LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS 
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 1-10 (2d ed. 1980). 
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izations and would have criminalized only speech that amounted to a direct 
and immediate incitement to acts of racist violence. 78 
In short, the American draft was wedded to American constitutional 
principles. In American constitutional law, the Constitution generally pro-
scribes only discrimination by the government. Our Constitution does not 
reach acts of discrimination by private parties. By the late 1960s, our first 
amendment jurisprudence already had begun to evolve to a stringent refor-
mulation of the clear and present danger test, requiring a tight causal 
connection between speech and illegal action before the government would 
criminalize the speech. 
Indeed, at roughly the same historical moment in which world opinion 
was mobilizing in favor of direct criminal sanctions against racist organi-
zations and racist speech, American law was moving in exactly the opposite 
direction. The Polish and Soviet draft, as I will return to discuss later, 
ultimately would find its way into the final treaty banning all forms of race 
discrimination in 1969. It turns out that 1969 was also the key year in 
American first amendment law as a result of a case called Brandenburg v. 
Ohio.19 
Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally conducted on a farm in 
Hamilton County, Ohio, outside Cincinnati. A local Cincinnati television 
station reporter had been invited to witness the rally, and he and a 
cameraman filmed the event. Portions of the rally were later broadcast on 
the Cincinnati station and a national network. The film footage is filled 
with vile, incendiary, racist bile. Klan members pronounced that "the nigger 
should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel,"80 and "if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revenge 
taken.'' 81 
The state of Ohio prosecuted Brandenburg, the leader of the Klan 
group, under an Ohio "criminal syndicalism" law that made it illegal to 
advocate "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or 
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform," or to assemble "with any group, or assemblage of persons 
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Bran-
denburg was convicted, fined $1,000, and sentenced to one to ten years 
imprisonment. 
The Ohio law had not been passed with groups like the Ku Klux Klan 
in mind but was rather a capitalist response to labor and socialist movements 
from an earlier time. Ohio had pressed this old law to new use, however, 
and it certainly fit. The Klan quite clearly did advocate and teach the 
propriety of "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods" to accom-
78. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2343. 
79. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
80. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969). 
81. Jd. at 447. 
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plish its own perverse image of "political reform." Ohio in 1969, in short, 
seemed to be in perfect harmony with developing world opinion because if 
you simply substitute the silly stilted phrase "criminal syndicalism" with 
the phrase "racial discrimination," the Ohio law becomes almost verbatim 
the draft of Poland and the Soviet Union in the United Nations Subcom-
mission. Ohio, like Poland and the Soviet Union, proposed to criminalize 
the use of racist propaganda and membership in racist groups. 
The United States Supreme Court in Brandenburg instructed Ohio, 
however, that its law was unconstitutional. No one was present at the Klan 
rally except the Klan members themselves, the television reporter, and his 
cameraman. Nothing in the record indicated that the orgy of race hate 
posed any immediate physical threat to anyone. In these circumstances, the 
Court held that the Klan was guilty only of the "abstract teaching" of the 
"moral propriety" of racist violence. The Supreme Court stated: 
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force 
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action. 82 
To underscore how much of a divergence Brandenburg was from the 
gaining international momentum against racist speech from prior American 
jurisprudence on the matter, compare Brandenburg with a Supreme Court 
case the decade before, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 83 decided in 1952. Beauhar-
nais was a criminal libel case involving an Illinois statute that criminalized 
any publication that portrayed "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack 
of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion" that 
exposes the class "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive 
of breach of the peace or riots."84 A racist Chicago organization known as 
the White Circle League of America distributed leaflets calling on the Mayor 
and City Council of Chicago to "halt the further encroachment, harassment 
and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, 
by the Negro." The leaflet called on "[o]ne million self respecting white 
people in Chicago to unite," and proclaimed that "[i]f persuasion and the 
need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro 
will not unite us, then the aggressions, . . . rapes, robbers, knives, guns 
and marijuana of the negro surely will."85 
The defendant, Beauharnais, was president of the White Circle League, 
and in his defense to the Illinois criminal prosecution, he asked that the 
jury be instructed that he could not be found guilty unless the leaflets were 
82. ld. 
83. 343 u.s. 250 (1952). 
84. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 
div. 1, § 471 (1949)). 
85. ld. at 252. 
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"likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil 
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. " 86 The 
Illinois court refused to use this instruction, and Beauharnais was convicted. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter. 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion is instructive in its preoccupation with two 
of the crucial "pressure points" in modern first amendment jurisprudence. 
Frankfurter's opinion does not contain any of the epistemological skepticism 
of modern first amendment thought. Rather, it is an exercise in certitude 
in which he appears to have no doubt that it is possible to distinguish 
speech that contributes to the intellectual marketplace from speech that 
merely communicates hate. Frankfurter similarly accepted with almost cav-
alier insouciance the proposition that it is within the legitimate province of 
the state legislature to make generic determinations concerning individual 
harm and communal danger. 
Frankfurter observed that, if a libelous utterance directed at an individ-
ual may be punished, "we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same 
utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a willful 
and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the 
State." Frankfurter observed that Illinois did not have to look beyond its 
own borders "or await the tragic experience of the last three decades" (a 
reference to Nazi Germany) to conclude that purveyors of racial and religious 
hate "promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjust-
ments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot commu-
nity." Recalling the murder in 1837 of the abolitionist Lovejoy to riots in 
Cicero in 1951, Frankfurter concluded that Illinois might deduce that racial 
tensions are exacerbated and more likely to flare into violence when racial 
messages are tolerated. 87 
Frankfurter also argued that Illinois was entitled to conclude that the 
dignity of the individual might be intertwined inextricably with protection 
for the reputation of his racial or religious group. Frankfurter stated that 
it was not for the Supreme Court to deny that the "Illinois legislature may 
warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportunities and 
the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the 
racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own 
merits. " 88 
In addition, Justice Frankfurter's opinion contained a short but inter-
esting discussion of freedom of speech. The argument against the Illinois 
law was that prohibiting libel of a creed or a racial group is "but a step 
from prohibi~ing libel of a political party." Frankfurter, however, clearly 
thought that a sharp first amendment distinction existed between restrictions 
on political speech and restrictions relating to "race, color, creed or relig-
86. Id. at 253. 
87. Id. at 258-59. 
88. Id. at 263. 
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ion." These terms, he insisted, had "attained too fixed a meaning to permit 
political groups to be brought within" their rubric, and for Frankfurter, 
that rubric was apparently outside the protections of the first amendment. 
Frankfurter noted: "Of course, discussion cannot be denied and the right, 
as well as the duty of criticism must not be stifled. " 89 But for Frankfurter 
there was nothing "political" about this speech. "If a statute sought to 
outlaw libels of political parties," he conceded, "quite different problems 
not now before us would be raised. " 90 But that problem could be dealt 
with if it were ever presented. Frankfurter was confident that " '[w]hile 
this Court sits' it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which 
encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel. " 91 
Viewed against the backdrop of Beauharnais, Brandenburg was a radical 
change in first amendment thinking. And viewed against the backdrop of 
developments in the United Nations, Brandenburg was a radical departure 
from international thinking. In 1965 first the Commission on Human Rights 
and then the Third Committee of the General Assembly voted overwhelm-
ingly to adopt the Polish and Soviet positions criminalizing racist propa-
ganda and participation in racist organizations.92 As it finally emerged, 
Article Four of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination contained sweeping language. The Article 
begins with a general condemnation of racist speech: 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which 
are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group 
of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify 
or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and 
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to 
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination .... 93 
Article Four then requires nations that are parties to the Convention to 
criminalize the dissemination of ideas based on racism, directing the nations 
to: 
declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimi-
nation, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts 
against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, 
including the financing thereof;94 
89. /d. at 264. 
90. !d. at 263 n.18. 
91. /d. at 263-64. 
92. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2343-44. 
93. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), reprinted in R. 
LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRU1.ffiNTS 160.1 (1983). 
94. /d. 
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Article Four forbids "public authorities or public institutions, national or 
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination, " 95 and requires nations to: 
declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and 
all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial 
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organiza-
tions or activities as an offence punishable by law.96 
The only concession to freedom of speech in Article Four is the pro 
forma conclusion that the requirements of the Article were drafted with 
"due regard" for the free expression principles recognized in international 
law, such as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
This, however, was an essentially empty reservation because the specific 
prohibitions of Article Four delineate the contours of whatever "regard" 
those free expression values are "due" in the context of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. 
Many other inte)."national documents embody the concept of freedom 
of expression. These documents also embody the values of racial and 
religious tolerance and are all sufficiently malleable to permit the restrictions 
in Article Four. While the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, for example, declares that 
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression" and that this right 
"shall include freedom to hold opinions, " 97 those guarantees are subject to 
the clause of exceptions: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impar-
tiality of the judiciary. 98 
Thus, the racial supremacy ideas condemned in Article Four could be 
defended as required by "public safety," the "prevention of disorder or 
crime," the protection of "health or morals," or the protection of "the 
reputation of others" -hardly a restrictive list. 
The Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination, including 
Article Four, was approved unanimously by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1965, and the United States was one of the first of the 
95. !d. 
96. !d. 
97. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), reprinted in R. 
LILLICH, supra note 93, at 500.1, 500.4 (1983). 
98. !d. art. 10, cl. (2), reprinted in R. LILLICH, supra note 93, at 500.4. 
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many nations to sign it. It was not submitted to the Senate for ratification, 
however, until1978, and the Senate has never ratified it. In fact, the Senate 
has undertaken no meaningful steps toward ratification. The reason for the 
Senate's recalcitrance is the First Amendment.99 
The Senate in 1986 did ratify another problematic international treaty, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 100 which contains the requirement that member nations criminalize the 
"[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide." 101 The Senate's rati-
fication, however, came with the reservation that the United States Consti-
tution would override the treaty with regard to the country's obligations 
under the Convention.102 The treaty's phrase "direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide" is, of course, much narrower than the broad condem-
nation on dissemination of ideas contained in Article Four of the Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The words "direct" and 
''incitement'' in the genocide convention would appear to make it compatible 
with existing first amendment law. 
Is there any possibility for common ground among libertarians and 
proponents of controls on racist and sexist speech on the incitement issue? 
In my view, common ground does exist, though we are still a long way 
from agreement on how large the common ground might be. In the final 
section of this article, I outline some of the points that should be considered 
at the negotiation table. 
V. THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND. 
A. Defining Levels of Protection. 
The analysis in the section above already contains a number of prop-
ositions defining the contours of racist and sexist speech. These might be 
organized around different levels of protection. 
1. Low Level Protection in Transactional Settings. 
When racist and sexist speech is part of a transactional setting, such as 
harassment in the workplace, it may be regulated. The only first amendment 
inquiry is into the bona fides of the purported transactional rationale. As 
long as we are satisfied that the rule is indeed genuinely transactional, it 
normally will be upheld. 
99. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2345. 
100. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), reprinted in R. Ln.ucH, supra note 
93, at 130.1. 
101. /d. art. 3, reprinted in R. Ln.LICH, supra note 93, at 130.1. 
102. 132 CoNo. REc. § 1377-78 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). 
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2. Absolute Protection for Opinion, Art, and Entertainment. 
When racist and sexist speech is the expression of opinion, it is absolutely 
protected. When it is a mixture of opinion and emotion, it is absolutely 
protected. When it is part of art or entertainment, it is absolutely protected. 
3. Qualified Protection. 
A communication that expresses hatred and does not contain any 
discernable opinion forfeits the absolute first amendment shelter for opinion. 
Such a communication, however, is still speech entitled to qualified first 
amendment shelter. The government should be permitted to penalize such 
speech only when it can articulate compelling reasons for classifying such 
speech as harmful and demonstrate a tight nexus between the speech and 
the harm. In the context of the incitement cases, this problem may be 
distilled into three questions: 
(1) Does the government have a compelling interest in reducing the 
emotional stigma caused by racist and sexist attacks, or is the government's 
compelling interest limited to preventing physical violence? 
(2) Are there certain forums and settings that justify greater latitude in 
governmental rules attempting to police racist and sexist speech, either by 
broadening the interests deemed to qualify as "compelling" in those settings 
or by loosening the causal nexus normally required between speech and 
harm? 
(3) To what degree should the answers to the two questions above be 
influenced by whether the attack is particularized toward an individual or 
is a generalized group attack? 
B. Prevention of Stigma as a Compelling State Interest: Cross-Indexing 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Nearly everyone seems to concede that a verbal attack directed at a 
particular individual in the sort of face-to-face confrontation that presents 
a clear and present danger of a violent physical reaction may be penalized. 
This is the one kernel of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire103 that still survives. 
103. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky the Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction 
against a Jehovah's Witness for uttering "fighting words" to a city marshall in the course of 
an incident arising from a hostile crowd reaction to the appellant's proselytizing on the street. 
The Supreme Court stated that certain "well-defined and narrowly limited" classes of speech 
"have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem" including "the insulting or 
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 571-72. 
Chaplinsky has good and bad components of theory but almost all bad application of 
theory to fact. Chaplinsky's intuition that speech primarily communicating something other 
than the exposition of ideas deserves less first amendment protection than intellectual speech 
is sound. To the extent that the case is based on the peculiar proximity of speech to violence 
characteristic of "fighting words," it is also sound and still good law. Chaplinsky is foolishly 
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A statute aimed at racist and sexist speech that only penalizes these "fighting 
words" confrontations and that requires a governmental showing of im-
minent danger in every individual case would be constitutional. 104 The statute 
or regulation also might be valuable symbolically because the statute at least 
makes some statement concerning human dignity and the repugnance of 
racist and sexist attacks. 
A mere fighting words statute, however, will reach almost none of the 
racist and sexist speech that proponents of controls seek to proscribe. 
Whatever the statute's symbolic value, in practical terms, the statute is 
relatively impotent. A fighting words statute, for example, would not have 
been sufficient to stop the speech of Nazis in Skokie, Illinois, perhaps the 
most graphic illustration of where modern first amendment jurisprudence 
has tended to leave us. 105 
simplistic, however, in maintaining that emotive speech is no part of the family of protected 
first amendment protection. Emotional speech may be connected intimately to ideas or may, 
as in the case of art or entertainment, deserve a full measure of constitutional protection in 
its own right. Chap/insky's whole crude methodology of simply listing certain taboo categories 
of speech and dislnissing them with the conclusory judgment that they are beneath the dignity 
of the first amendment has been disowned by the Supreme Court with the sole exception of 
obscenity. 
Chap/insky also is flawed because it is not anything like our current first amendment 
skepticism concerning the ability of decisionrnakers to separate the various strands of speech. 
Mr. Chaplinsky did have an intellectual message that was aimed against the government and 
its officials. Police officers must endure as an occupational hazard cries of "fascist" when 
they arrest demonstrators for talking peacefully on the streetcorner. 
104. It !night be argued that, while a properly drawn general fighting words statute would 
be constitutional and legitimately could be applied to a racist or sexist provocation, it would 
be unconstitutional to draft a fighting words statute that singled out only one species of 
fighting words-racist and sexist attacks-for coverage. This !night be seen as content-based 
discrimination. This analysis is flawed. A "racist and sexist speech" fighting words statute 
surely is not rendered constitutionally infirm merely because the statute narrows the range of 
prosecution from a larger set of prescribable speech. Under current first amendment doctrine, 
for example, a state may regulate obscenity if its regulation meets governing constitutional 
standards for defining the term. Assume that a statute, after properly defining obscenity, 
contained a blanket exception for all obscene books and magazines but permitted prosecution 
for obscene films. The constitutionality of the statute should not be diminished merely because 
the legislature has exercised restraint. Similarly, prosecutions under espionage statutes otherwise 
defensible under the first amendment never have been thought infirm merely because the 
prosecutions are aimed at one subject matter, speech inilnical to national security. 
105. Skokie, a suburb of Chicago, is one of the most unique communities in the United 
States because it has a special demographic link to Hitler's holocaust. In 1977 the village had 
about 70,000 residents, 40,000 of whom were Jewish. In the 1930s the village had a substantial 
German population that had supported a German Nazi organization but died out when the 
United States entered World War II. After World War II, Skokie's Jewish population 
mushroomed. Approximately 5,000 village residents were members of families that had suffered 
direct persecution at the hands of Nazis, and as many as 1,200 were actual survivors of Nazi 
concentration camps. These holocaust survivors were closely knit and well organized with a 
distinct identity as a subcommunity within Skokie. See D. DoWNs, NAZIS IN SKOKIE 21 (1985). 
The antagonist of the Je\vish survivors in Skokie was Frank Collin, the leader of a Nazi 
organization called the National Socialist Party of America. Collin came from Marquette Park, 
which in 1977 was a white, ethnic enclave on the south side of Chicago plagued by a racially 
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May incitement statutes go beyond a clear and present danger of 
producing violence and reach out to encompass clear and present dangers 
incendiary siege mentality. Collin's message was one of white supremacy and hatred of blacks 
and Jews. In March 1977 Collin told officials in Skokie that he wished to stage a peaceful 
rally in front of the village hall to protest a village ordinance requiring the posting of a 
$350,000 bond as a condition on using the village parks for assemblies. Collin informed the 
village that the protest would consist of 30 to 50 demonstrators and that the demonstrators 
would wear facsimiles of German Nazi party uniforms during Hitler's reign and swastika 
emblems and armbands. Moreover, the demonstrators would carry their party banner containing 
the swastika and would carry signs with the messages "White Free Speech" and "Free Speech 
for the White Man." 
The village of Skokie promptly filed suit to enjoin the marchers from displaying any 
materials "which incite or promote hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry," 
including the wearing of Nazi uniforms or brandishing the swastika. 
The village's argument was based on two related but distinct themes, one based on the 
inevitability of reactive violence against the Nazis, the other on empathy for the excruciating 
emotional distress that the Nazi symbols would cause the survivors of German persecution. 
The village argued that the march was nothing less than a "symbolic assault against large 
numbers of the residents" and an "incitation to violence and retaliation." An Illinois state 
trial court conducted a hearing on the village's injunction request and heard evidence that 
some 15 to 18 Jewish organizations along with other anti-Nazi groups planned to stage a 
counter-demonstration if the Nazi's were allowed to march. The village stated that the Nazi 
march and the ensuing counter-demonstrations would generate "an uncontrollably violent 
situation" and that "bloodshed would occur." One concentration camp survivor testified 
before the trial judge that the swastika is a symbol that his closest family members were killed 
by the Nazis and that the lives of him and his children presently are not safe. While the 
witness did not intend to use violence against the Nazi marchers, he said that he did not know 
if he could control himself. 
The trial court enjoined the Nazi march. The intermediate Illinois appellate court affirmed 
the injunction. The case then went to the Illinois Supreme Court which refused a request to 
grant expedited review of the case and which refused to grant any stay of the injunction 
pending appeal. This had the practical effect of denying to Collin and the marchers the 
opportunity to demonstrate on their appointed day because under the normal schedule of the 
Illinois Supreme Court the case would not be decided for at least a year and the injunction 
would be in force the whole time. The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 
held that the failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to provide for either immediate appellate 
review or a stay of the injunction pending review violated the first amendment. The Supreme 
Court did not say that the Nazis had a constitutional right to march in Skokie but only that 
the Nazis had a constitutional right to be free of prior restraints against such a march unless 
the prior restraints were accompanied by special procedural safeguards including swift appellate 
review. National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Illinois appellate court, which this time 
modified the injunction to a prohibition only on displaying the swastika. Skokie v. National 
Socialist Party of Am., 51 III. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977). The Illinois Supreme 
Court, however, reviewed that decision and ultimately held that the entire injunction was 
invalid. Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 III. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). 
Meanwhile, the village fought an aggressive rear-guard action, enacting a flurry of 
ordinances aimed at derailing Collin's planned march. One provision of the Skokie ordinances 
prohibited the "dissemination of any materials within the Village of Skokie that promotes and 
incites hatred against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion, and is 
intended to do so." Skokie Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-995, reprinted in L. BOLLINGER, 
THE ToLERANT SociETY 252 n.47 (1986). Another provision required, as a condition on the 
issuance of any parade or public assembly permit, that the activity "will not portray criminality, 
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of inducing stigma? Stigma is at the heart of modern equal protection 
analysis. In Brown v. Board of Education106 the Supreme Court stated that 
separating black children from white children solely because of their race 
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 107 
As Professor Charles Lawrence explains, Brown held that separate was 
inherently unequal "because of the message that segregation conveyed that 
black children were an untouchable caste unfit to go to school with white 
children.'' 108 
In Anderson v. Martin109 the Supreme Court struck down a state law 
requiring the designation of the race of candidates on ballots. While no one 
doubts that voters in the privacy of the voting booth may take racial identity 
into account in casting their votes, the government may not encourage that 
accounting by placing into prominence on the ballot the race of the 
candidate. This was different in kind from designating the candidate as 
"republican" or "democrat" and placing little elephants or donkeys next 
to the labels. The Supreme Court held that to identify candidates by race, 
places "the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces 
racial prejudice at the polls." 110 
depravity, or lack of virtue in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse, or hostility toward a person 
or group of persons by reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional 
affiliation." Skokie Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-994, reprinted in L. BoLLINGER, supra, at 
201 n.47. The ordinance further provided that "no person shall engage in any march, walk 
or public demonstration as a member or on behalf of any political party while wearing a 
military-style uniform." Skokie Village Ordinance No. 77-5-N-996, reprinted in L. BOLLINGER, 
supra, at 252 n.47. The ordinance defined political party as "an organization existing primarily 
to influence and deal with the structure or affairs of government, politics, or the state." /d. 
This time the litigation battles were fought in federal court with the Nazis suing 'to block 
enforcement of the ordinances. The Nazis were successful. First, the federal district court and 
then the Seventh Circuit held the ordinances unconstitutional. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. 
Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.). aff'd, 518 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). The village requested the Supreme 
Court to stay the lower federal court injunctions but the request was denied. Smith v. Collin, 
436 U.S. 953 (1978). Three days before the march was scheduled, Frank Collin called the 
march off, claiming that his purpose all along merely had been to make the first amendment 
point that his party had a right to demonstrate in Skokie. Collin claimed that he had made 
the point and that the march was moot. This sniveling retreat was, at least in part, disingenuous. 
Frank Collin did not merely exploit symbols in Skokie; he exploited the first amendment itself, 
and he did it to cause human suffering. "I used it," Collin said. "I planned the reaction of 
the Jews. They are hysterical." D. DoWNs, supra, at 19. See also D. HAMLIN, THE NAZI/ 
SKOKIE CONFLICT (1980). 
Later that summer, Collins and his Nazis did hold a one hour rally in Chicago. A puny 
band of 25 Nazi demonstrators were protected by 400 Chicago police in full riot regalia. Some 
rocks and bottles were thrown, but there was no serious violence. The police made 72 arrests. 
106. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
107. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
108. Lawrence, The Debates Over Placing Limits on Racist Speech Must Not Ignore the 
Damage It Does to Its Victims, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., October 25, 1989, at Bl. 
109. 375 u.s. 399 (1964). 
110. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). 
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As our equal protection theory has evolved, government is not bereft 
of all power to classify on the basis of race. Current doctrine does permit 
the use of race in affirmative action programs that meet the rigors of the 
"strict scrutiny" test.lll If government is permitted to classify on the basis 
of race, it must be permitted to speak in terms of racial identity; racial 
classifications require racial speech. This affirmative action jurisprudence, 
however, does not undercut the lesson of Brown and its progeny outlawing 
governmental actions and words that stigmatize; rather, affirmative action 
reinforces Brown. Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke112 pronounced as a "cardinal principle" the proposition that "racial 
classifications that stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption 
that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of 
government behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without 
more." 113 
Thus, we may extrapolate two rules from contemporary equal protection 
theory relevant to racist speech. First, not only is the government permitted 
to eliminate all racist messages from the realm of governmental speech, it 
is under a constitutional duty to cleanse its own speech of racism. Second, 
government is not stripped of the power to invoke racial identity in passing 
laws; race may be referred to and used as the basis for legal classifications 
but only if the use of race meets the tough requirements of recent affirmative 
action decisions and it does not stigmatize. 
C. Racist Speech in Government Forums. 
The next step is much harder. May we build from these two rules a 
third rule that would permit the government to go beyond cleansing its own 
speech and permit the government to penalize the racist speech of private 
citizens at least when they speak in governmentally created forums such as 
university campuses? If our modern fourteenth amendment is understood 
to contain restrictions on governmental speech as well as action, to what 
extent should the speech principles of the fourteenth amendment be inter-
preted to modify the speech principles of the first amendment? 
On the equal protection side are the familiar tools of the state action 
doctrine. Ostensibly, private conduct may at times bear a sufficiently close 
nexus to the state that we are willing to characterize the private activity as 
governmental and subject it to the requirements of the equal protection 
clause. Modern state action doctrine is sufficiently latitudinarian, for ex-
ample, to bring within its compass the speech of state university professors 
in classrooms or the speech of officially sanctioned student organizations 
on a state campus. 114 
Ill. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989). 
112. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
113. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
114. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
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We also can build from the first amendment side. There is first 
amendment authority for the proposition that when government creates a 
forum for private speech .the government enjoys a broader power to regulate 
the content of the speech than it would otherwise possess. The federal 
government, having created the forum for speech on the electronic broadcast 
spectrum, has a greater power to regulate speech on that spectrum than 
speech in the ambient atmosphere. For a time, many scholars thought that 
this exception to the general first amendment presumption against content-
based regulation was tied to the peculiarities of spectrum scarcity. 
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,m however, the Supreme Court per-
mitted the regulation of indecent speech on the airwaves on a rationale that 
went well beyond scarcity. When we are dealing with racist speech on 
governmental forums, including university campuses, Pacifica may be the 
single most important existing first amendment precedent. The Court in 
Pacifica upheld the authority of the FCC to sanction a radio station for 
broadcasting George Carlin's "seven dirty words" comedy routine. Carlin's 
routine was not legally obscene but merely "indecent."116 
Pacifica is not "just a broadcasting" case because its analysis is not 
tied to the physical characteristic that sets broadcasting apart from other 
forms of speech regulation, spectrum scarcity. Scarcity legitimately may be 
invoked to justify such devices as "equal time" or "fairness doctrine" 
regulations because those doctrines are linked logically to scarcity. If there 
is only limited time and space on the governmentally owned broadcast 
spectrum, the government may condition the grant of licenses to use the 
spectrum on the requirement that the licensees permit multiple voices to be 
heard. 
Pacifica, however, was not an equal time case. The offended listener 
was not seeking an opportunity to come on the air and rail against George 
Carlin's brand of humor. The argument, rather, was that Carlin's language 
should not be heard at all on the radio. For the Supreme Court to accept 
this proposition, as it did, necessitated resort to a rationale broader than 
spectrum scarcity because scarcity at most requires that the soapbox be 
shared. Scarcity cannot be used to set limits on what is said while a speaker 
has the soapbox. 
Thus, the Court rested its analysis on other grounds. By emphasizing 
two attributes of broadcasting, its "pervasive" influence on our lives and 
its peculiar accessibility to children, the Court was willing to approve of 
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). While the Court has 
taken a decided turn toward narrowing the scope of the state action doctrine, see, e.g., 
Rendeli-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), most of the activities of 
officially sanctioned and supported organizations on state university campuses still would seem 
to be within the contours of the doctrine. 
115. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
116. The Carlin routine is quite funny, and while never to be heard again on the American 
airwaves, it is available on tape and compact disk. 
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the use of a dichotomy that it had held was impermissible elsewhere: the 
distinction between the intellectual message of speech and the manner in 
which it is spoken. Thus, Justice Stevens' opinion in Pacifica dismissed any 
concerns about the censorial implications of his decision because of what 
he perceived as the low social value of the speech at issue: "At most, the 
Commission's definition of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of 
patently offensive references· to excretory and sexual organs and activi-
ties."117 Justice Stevens found these references to be "at the periphery of 
the First Amendment." 118 Justice Stevens then adopted for purposes of 
broadcast regulation the dichotomy between the message and the mode that 
cases such as Cohen and Hustler reject, the dictum that if you can't say 
something nicely, don't say it at all. Justice Stevens claimed: "A requirement 
that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form 
rather than the content of serious communication." 119 Justice Stevens stated 
further that "[t]here are few, if any thoughts that cannot be expressed by 
the use of less .offensive language." 120 
D. Individual v. Group Attacks. 
I have saved discussion of the distinction between individual and group 
attacks for last, not because it is unimportant, but because it is tempting 
to grab onto this simple dichotomy as the dominant test for measuring the 
constitutionality of controls. While the distinction is probative of the un-
derlying balance of interests, it ought not be regarded as dispositive because 
the distinction may be underinclusive and overinclusive. Not all proscribable 
racist and sexist speech is individually directed, and not all individually 
directed racist and sexist speech is proscribable. 
The types of statements identified in this essay as deserving absolute 
protection, such as statements of opinion or statements made in the context 
of art or entertainment do not lose their protection merely because they are 
directed at an individual.121 Conversely, transactional racist and sexist state-
ments do not gain immunity merely because they are cast in generalized 
group terms. There may be mass violations of civil rights acts, fair housing 
laws, or labor laws as easily as individual violations. 122 
The intuition that individual attacks are proscribable more easily than 
group attacks is informed by three judgments. First, it might be thought 
that as an attack becomes more directed toward an individual, it becomes 
more likely that the attack communicates emotion and not opinion. Group 
ll7. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1976). 
liS. Id. 
ll9. Id. at 743 n.18. 
120. Id. 
121. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
122. Racist statements directed at large racial groups are included within the prohibition 
of the National Labor Relations Board rules against racist exhortations in labor elections. I 
defend these rules under transactional speech principles. See supra text accompanying note 
123; Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). 
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slurs, on the other hand, might be thought to contain ugly cognitive 
assertions, but cognitive assertions, non~theless, that members of the group 
possess certain characteristics. Second, it might be thought that the stigma 
caused by group attacks lacks the palpable intensity of the individual insult. 
The government's interest in sheltering citizens from racist and sexist injuries 
arguably diminishes as the harm is diffused. Third, when ·the penalty is 
fashioned in terms of tort recovery, the law may balk at what are really 
"proximate cause" concerns. To treat group insults as a form of mass tort 
in which there can be class recovery runs counter to the traditional suspicion 
of tort claims grounded in nonphysical injury in which the class of plaintiffs 
is large and indeterminate. 123 
While these intuitions do tend to make responsibility for group insults 
more problematic than individuated attacks, we should be wary about 
adopting a per se rule prohibiting penalties for racist and sexist speech 
aimed at groups. In at least some contexts, such as special governmental 
forums, it is possible to imagine group insults lacking any discernable 
"idea" and in the aggregate generating stigma far greater in magnitude 
than an individual attack. 
VI. CoNCLUSION. 
The purpose of this essay was not to construct the ideal statute for 
controlling racist and sexist speech but rather to encourage free thinking 
about free speech that might be useful in putting together a defensible 
model. As a starting point for devising a statutory scheme, I propose the 
following set of rules: 
1. Individualized Attacks in Face-to-Face Confrontations. In · 
face-to-face confrontations in which the racist speech is directed to 
individuals, the speaker may be penalized either through criminal 
prosecution or through a private tort action for damages for uttering 
"fighting words," provided that the state can demonstrate a clear 
and present danger of physical confrontation (The key here is not 
that the attack is directed to only one person-for the attack may 
well be directed to a group of people-but rather that the person 
or persons to whom the attack is directed are in an immediate 
"face-to-face" situation that creates a clear and present danger of 
precipitating violence.). 
2. Group Attacks in Certain Settings Outside the General Mar-
ketplace of Discourse. Group racist attacks should be subject to 
penalties in specified settings outside the general marketplace of 
123. See Khalid Abdullah Tariq AI Mansour Faissal Fahd AI Tala! v. Fanning, 506 F. 
Supp. 186 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (refusing to recognize defamation action for derogatory reference 
to 600 million Muslims); Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Grace, 9 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (refusing to recognize defamation action for group reference 
to 900,000 Puerto Ricans). 
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discourse, provided that the definitions of the types of speech that 
qualify as "racist attacks" are drawn with sufficient precision to 
meet generally applicable first amendment standards. 
Thus, this rule has two components, one involving the setting of the 
speech and the other involving the definition of the type of speech covered. 
In certain specified settings, general first amendment rules regarding the 
nature and proximity of the harm required to justify controls on speech 
should not apply. A lower threshold of harm and a looser nexus of proof 
linking the speech to the harm should be permitted. Specifically, the 
government should be required to demonstrate that physical injury or some 
other palpable harm (such as loss of employment) is at stake, but also may 
justify the controls on the basis of the emotional distress felt by members 
of the group that is subject to the attack and the injury to community 
values of tolerance caused by the attack. 
With regard to the second component of the rule, however, normal 
first amendment doctrines should apply. The controls should be upheld only 
if the controls are drawn very precisely so that the speaker is able to discern 
with reasonable clarity what speech is or is not covered. The special settings 
include: 
(1) speech by the government as an institution or by government 
employees speaking on issues related to the business of government; 
(2) speech by actors in economic transactional settings, such as man-
agement and employees in the public and private sector on issues related to 
terms or conditions of employment, or speech by real estate agents in the 
sale or rental of housing; 
(3) speech by school children, teachers, and administrators at the 
elementary and secondary levels on school grounds whether or not part of 
classroom instruction; 
(4) speech by public university professors, students, and administrators 
during classroom instruction, or in other settings directly involving the 
university's instructional mission but not in university settings that are part 
of the "general marketplace" of university discourse; and 
(5) mass-media speech directed to children where there is no technolog-
ically feasible method of preventing children from viewing the material. 
In these limited settings, it should be permissible to penalize racist 
attacks on groups even though the attacks would not meet the requirements 
of the clear and present danger test for face-to-face individual confronta-
tions. In each of these special settings, one or more factors are present 
justifying lowered first amendment protection. The Constitution itself im-
poses an affirmative obligation on government to cleanse its own speech of 
racial stigma. For example, when government is acting as an educator of 
children, the government's role as an inculcator of civic values should permit 
it to teach children to be tolerant and to punish children for engaging in 
racist attacks while on school grounds. Similarly, in the context of mass 
media speech aimed at children, special considerations relevant to the 
transmission of public values should permit greater regulation of speech 
than otherwise would be acceptable. 
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A state university is different from a public elementary or high school 
because by tradition a university is a place of uninhibited public discourse 
and should remain so. A university, however, is also a unique community 
in which the state should be permitted to require of its members higher 
levels of rationality and civility than the state may impose on the general 
population. It should be permissible for the state to require that members 
refrain from racist attacks at certain places and times as a condition for 
entry into this special community. 
Many parts of a state university must be open forums for discourse, 
and it would be unconstitutional to apply special, group racist attack rules 
to them. These open forum areas should include the open areas of the 
campus including malls, greens, squares, plazas, streets, sidewalks, meeting 
rooms, auditoriums, and other spaces traditionally open to all comers 
(including bulletin boards in such spaces). Publications such as the campus 
newspaper or professional journals published by the university and displays 
for all forms of creative and artistic expression such as art galleries or stage 
productions also should be open forums. Other parts of the university, 
however, traditionally are not open free speech forums but rather are 
dedicated directly to the university's academic function. These include 
classrooms during class times, libraries, laboratories, and recreation and 
research centers. The university should be permitted under the first amend-
ment to treat these areas as "restricted zones" where members of the 
university community can be assured that they will not be subjected to 
racist attacks. 
Finally, the government may treat speech involving economic transac-
tions, for example, in both the public and private sector employment context, 
as outside the general marketplace of discourse and subject to special 
restrictions regarding racist attacks. The government is entitled to enact 
legislation for the purpose of encouraging a "racism-free workplace" be-
cause racism in the workplace is uniquely "transactional" and, therefore, 
deserving of lower first amendment scrutiny. In regulating the speech 
government simultaneously regulates the transaction. This form of govern-
ment regulation of racist speech in economic transactions already is quite 
common. Civil rights laws governing employment, rulings of the National 
Labor Relations Board governing labor elections, and rules governing ad-
vertising and the conduct of real estate agents under Fair Housing laws all 
attempt to eliminate racially discriminatory transactions in part by limiting 
racist speech. 
Even in these special restricted zones, however, government should not 
be relieved of the general first amendment requirement of defining with 
precision the type of speech that is covered by the restrictions. Precision in 
definition should be regarded as a first amendment "universal" applicable 
in all regulation of speech. 
Is it possible to define "racist attacks" with enough clarity to meet 
generally applicable first amendment standards? In a recent test case, Doe 
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v. University of Michigan, 124 a federal district court struck down as uncon-
stitutional efforts by the University of Michigan to control racist attacks. 
The decision in University of Michigan was correct because the University, 
despite a valiant effort, failed to confine sufficiently its definition of covered 
speech. The Michigan case raises the question of whether it is possible to 
draw a narrower regulation that would meet first amendment precision 
requirements. 
Defining terms for controls on racist and sexist speech is extremely 
difficult and highlights one of the recurring problems endemic to controlling 
speech: defining classes of speech in generic terms on the basis of content 
always will be a more problematic form of regulation than controlling 
speech on the basis of its nexus to concrete social harm (such as physical 
violence). Whenever generic definitions are employed, there is an automatic 
tension. Because our general first amendment jurisprudence requires that 
we err on the side of allowing "bad" speech to go free rather than risk 
penalizing the "good" speech with the bad, all attempts at simple, elegant 
definitions may be vulnerable because such definitions sweep too broadly. 
On the other hand, if we treat the precision requirement conscientiously, 
trying scrupulously to avoid bringing into the net any protected first 
amendment expression, we are in danger of precision-tooling the definition 
to a point so narrow that the definition becomes meaningless. 
There are many different strategies available to solve the definition 
problem, from mechanical approaches such as listing specific taboo words 
to more ambitious efforts to define speech in terms of its functions, 
purposes, or effects. In the context of racist speech, for example, the 
following characteristics, alone or in combination, are nominees for inclu-
sion: 
(1) speech that "stigmatizes" or "victimizes" on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or religion; 
(2) speech that "threatens" the security of members of a group, either 
in their physical safety or in the maintenance ortheir institutional positions, 
such as their jobs or their seats at a university; 
(3) speech that advocates physical violence against racial groups even 
in the abstract; 
(4) speech that espouses views of racial superiority or inferiority, such 
as by using stereotyp~s to ascribe negative characteristics to members of 
certain groups; 
(5) speech that is "defamatory" in the traditional legal sense for libel 
and slander by tending to subject members of the group to ridicule, obloquy, 
or diminished esteem; 
(6) speech that commonly is understood to convey in a direct and 
visceral way hatred or contempt, such as speech that employs words that 
are understood as vulgar or derogatory terms of hatred or contempt to 
identify groups; 
124. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
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(7) speech that intentionally is calculated to generate severe emotional 
distress in members of the group; 
(8) speech that bears some specified likelihood (such as "posing a 
reasonable likelihood" or "posing a clear and present danger") of generating 
severe emotional distress in members of the group; 
(9) speech that would be deemed to have some highly onerous quality 
(such as being "outrageous" or "highly offensive") to the ordinary reason-
able person in the community; 
(10) speech that communicates only hatred and is otherwise devoid of 
any intellectual content; 
(11) speech that is devoid of some specified level of redeeming social 
value (such as "serious political, artistic, religious, or scientific value"); 
(12) speech that does not contain any expression of opinion. 
A critic might think that none of these nominees are very good and 
that certainly the author is secretly attempting to sabotage the whole effort. 
Almost all attempts to control group racist attacks, however, have in fact 
involved one or more of these ingredients, and if the definitions seem at 
first unsatisfying, that is only because the speech-defining business inherently 
is so ethereal. 
The list, however, poses some clear choices. Controls on racist and 
sexist speech will not withstand constitutional scrutiny if the definitions are 
cast in terms of speech that "stigmatize" or "victimize" or "threaten" the 
"security" or "position" of members of a racial group. The court struck 
down the University of Michigan's attempt because terms such as "stigma," 
"victim," and "threat" are too general and too susceptible to subjective 
interpretation to satisfy first amendment norms. While words like "threaten" 
may be too indefinite, the phrase "advocates physical violence against racial 
groups," even in the abstract, is different. This phrase has a precise meaning 
and involves a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent-physical 
violence. Its only failing under general first amendment standards is that it 
fails the proximity requirement. Mere "abstract advocacy" is not the sort 
of direct incitement contemplated by the clear and present danger test. 
Because proximity rules should not apply in the special "restricted zone" 
settings, however, this nominee has promise because it does seem to address 
our precision concerns. If this nominee causes problems, it is not in the 
proximity or precision category but rather in the fact/ opinion dichotomy. 
Many international documents are cast in terms of speech that espouse 
doctrines of racial superiority. Once again, this is not a particularly difficult 
nominee from the precision perspective, but it presents serious "expression 
of opinion" problems. 
If we think that opinion, even racist opinion, always must be protected 
under the first amendment, some device for separating racist speech that is 
devoid of opinion must be employed. Thus, we might require that the racist 
attack be devoid of "intellectual content," or of "redeeming social value," 
or simply insist that it not contain any "expression of opinion." In ad-
dressing this difficulty, we will be forced to confront the first amendment 
orthodoxy that forbids any cleavage between the treatment of the intellectual 
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and emotional components of speech. As previously argued, however, that 
principle, while absolutely sound in the arena of general public discourse, 
should not be binding in "restricted zones" where greater regulation of 
speech is permitted. 
Finally, a whole basket of choices exists with regard to the purpose and 
effect of the speech. Some device must be employed to separate the serious 
affront to human dignity and norms of community civility from the more 
trivial insults that are endemic to social life. Inevitably, we will be tempted 
to penalize. only the intentional infliction of distress (as opposed to the 
accidental insult) and, further, to try our hand at defining the level of 
distress or incivility required to trigger a violation. While it is tempting to 
resort to the word "defamatory," and hitch our definition to that traditional 
legal term of art, many racist attacks do not fit neatly into the conventional 
definitions of libel and slander because the attacks do not lower the 
reputations of the victims in the eyes of others in the community. The 
victim of a racist attack is not always in the same position as the victim of 
a defamatory attack. Others do not necessarily think less of the victim but 
rather may be moved to sympathy at the outrageous victimization. Thus, 
racist group defamation may be one useable ingredient in the definition, 
but it may not be enough to get at what we are after. 
Once we move away from the safe traditions of defamation, however, 
definitions again become difficult. In the Hustler decision the Supreme 
Court held that the term "outrageous" was too imprecise to satisfy first 
amendment standards in a suit for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Even though Hustler was a "general marketplace" and not a "re-
stricted zone" case, first amendment precision rules still should apply. In 
Hustler, however, Virginia had attempted to use phrases such as "highly 
offensive," "outrageous," and "severe distress" coupled with intent to 
create that distress as the only gatekeepers to liability. Anything might be 
offensive under the Virginia law, including a parody heavily laden with 
opinion (albeit crude) about Reverend Falwell, a public figure. A racist 
speech statute, however, could include the requirements of severe distress 
and outrageousness over and above other defining elements that already 
had narrowed the field. 
Putting it all together, what follows is a proposal that, if limited to 
"restricted zones," should pass first amendment requirements: 
I. Racist Group Attack Defined. 
The phrase "racist group attacks" as used in this law is defined as 
speech: 
(1) that is intended to inflict severe emotional distress in members 
of a racial, ethnic, or religious group; and 
(2) creates a clear and present danger of inflicting such distress in 
an ordinary reasonable person who is a member of the group; and 
(3) is defamatory or would be highly offensive to an ordinary person 
in the community; and 
(4) is not, when considered in the context in which it was uttered 
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or published, part of any serious political, artistic, religious, or 
scientific debate or discussion. 
II. Highly Offensive to an Ordinary Reasonable Person Defined. 
As used in this regulation, speech shall be deemed capable of 
satisfying the requirement of being highly offensive to an ordinary 
reasonable person in the community only if: 
(1) it advocates physical violence against members of the group, 
even in the abstract; or 
(2) it espouses views of racial superiority or inferiority by using 
stereotypes to ascribe negative characteristics to members of certain 
groups; or 
(3) employs words that are commonly understood as vulgar or 
derogatory terms of hatred or contempt to identify groups. 
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It should be emphasized that the group racist attack proposal set forth 
in this article would not be constitutional when applied to the general 
marketplace of discourse. In the context of university campuses, the proposal 
would not apply to areas that are open forums for discourse. 
The very fact that the drafting process becomes so extraordinarily 
difficult once one moves away from the simple face-to-face "fighting words" 
model is a strong argument for not attempting to police group attacks at 
all. The overwhelming international consensus on the evil of such attacks 
and the unique historical experience with racism in the United States, 
however, provide a compelling reason for permitting narrowly drafted 
controls on racist speech. Narrow drafting almost always is missing in other 
attempts to control speech on the basis of its content. In this respect racist 
attacks are entirely different from flag-burning. Forced patriotism is never 
a compelling state interest. But racial tolerance, at least in those "restricted 
zones" outside the general marketplace of discourse, is one of the few 
constitutional values as compelling as free speech itself. Properly focused 
within narrow confines, restrictions on speech enforcing racial tolerance 
should be permitted. 
If the modest outlines of permissible controls suggested in this article 
seem to upset the certainty with which we have fixed the stars in our 
constitutional constellation,t25 perhaps that is healthy. "For certainty is 
generally illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." 126 
125. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
126. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897). 
